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The Changing Face of American
Corporate Law Practice
by

John FLOOD *

Introduction.

The professions of the 1980s are completely different from the
situation in the 1930s. They are now subject to the norms of business
rather than the standards of professionalism.1 It is part of the pur
pose of this article to show that the practice of law has become a
business like any other business activity. As a result of this trans
formation, the norms and standards so often identified with the
professions have eroded.
In the next part of the article, I outline some of the demographic
changes that have taken place in the legal profession and the reasons
for them. This is followed by a discussion of how the large corporate

law firm operates,2 using two case studies : an example of anti

trust litigation and the restructuring of an international corporation.

The Demographic Profile.

The legal profession in the United States is huge. In 1985 there
were 655,191 lawyers, an increase of 21 percent since the beginning
* Assistant Professor of Criminal Justice and Assistant Professor of Law,
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of the decade.3 The vast majority of these, over 70 percent, are in
private practice. This works out to one lawyer for every 513 members

of the population.4

If we look at the growth of the lawyer population against that of
the general population in the U.S. since 1870, we see that from 1870
to 1970 the two have paralleled each other fairly closely, except for

two slight rises in 1900 and 1940. In 1870 lawyers numbered

40.000; by 1900 the number had nearly tripled to 115.000; and by 1970
the number had reached 300.000, from which point it has skyrocketed.5

The present legal profession population is by no means a homo
geneous mass. The majority of lawyers are in private practice (70 ?/o),

with just under half of them in solo practice. The next largest pro
portion (11.2 ?/o) is found in law firms of 51 and above lawyers.6
These proportions represent a decline in solo practice being compen
sated by a rise in corporate practice. Table 1 illustrates the changes
in these proportions since 1960.

table 1
Private Practitioners by Practice Setting (Selected Years)

1960: % Solo ?/o Firm Total
All Lawyers (N = 285,933). 46 26 72
Practitioners (N = 206,000). 64 36 100

1970:

All Lawyers (N = 355,242). 35 33 68
Practitioners (N = 240,000). 52 48 100

1980:

All Lawyers (N = 542205). 33 35 68

Practitioners (N = 370,111). 49 51 100

(Reprinted with permission from Barbara A. Curran et al., The Lawyer

Statistical Report: A Statistical Profile of the U.S. Legal Profession in the 1980s,
Chicago : American Bar Foundation, 1985, p. 14).

Whereas in 1960 solo practice claimed 64 percent of private practi
tioners, by 1980 more than half were engaged in firm practice.

Why the legal profession has grown so markedly still largely
remains unsolved. But to some extent we can speculate that the
twin forces of economy and state should have exercised considerable

influence ? through increased business activity and state regula

tion of affairs ? on this growth in lawyers' numbers.
One of the most startling increases in the past fifteen years has
been the rise of the large corporate law firm. Though this type of
n? 35 - f?vrier 1988
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firm is in a minority in absolute numbers,7 its influence is overarch
ing. Some firms are now composed of upwards of 400 lawyers : the
largest law firm in the world, Baker and McKenzie, with at least
750 lawyers, and offices in most of the major cities of the world, is
predicted to expand its numbers into the thousand range by the last
decade of the century. These large firms are also huge enterprises in
their own right like the corporations they serve. In 1985 Skadden,
Arps, Slate, Meagher and Flom had gross revenues of $ 169 million. 8
Since, historically, elite lawyers have been in the vanguard of the
development of the American legal profession 9 ? as in forming the
Association of the Bar of the City of New York in 1870 and the Ameri

can Bar Association in 1878 10 ? and typically have clustered in large
corporate firms, their importance in both the polity and the economy

cannot be overestimated.11 The era of ? mega-lawyering ?, as Marc
Galanter has called it,12 is qualitatively different from that which
preceded it. Mega-law firms are similar in scope and size to the orga
nizations for which they work.13
The Structure of Large Law Firms.
Large law firms are broadly divided along the lines of partners ?

the members and owners of the firm ? and associates who are
employed by the partnership.14 To explain how the system operates

I will start with the associates and progress upwards to the part

ners. 15 Associates are hired from law school : there is no intervening
period of apprenticeship, for shortly after graduating from law school
the associate will take the state bar examination and, on passing,
will be admitted to the bar.16

There is currently a shortage of law school graduates for the elite
bar. A firm such as Shadden, Arps, a leader in the mergers and acqui
sitions field, has 526 lawyers of whom 404 are associates. Skadden,
Arps, like other firms, has to compete in a shrinking market of qua
lified law school graduates; 17 thus salary wars break out. In 1985

when a single firm on Wall Street, Cravath, Swaine and Moore,
decided to raise its starting salary to $ 65,000 dollars per annum, other

firms, however reluctant, were forced to increase their salaries by
similar proportions.
These salary wars create tensions both within firms and between
firms. Once such an increase is put into effect, other more senior
associates must receive raises also. These increases are paid for in
one of two ways : either the extra cost is passed on to clients in the
form of higher billing rates, or, to avoid raising billing rates, the
REVUE FRANQAISE D'^TUDES AM&ttCAINES
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partners can reduce the size of their draws. Tensions between firms

arise when a firm decides not to institute the increase. This can
spur an exodus of associates from the firm to others. Even though

the increase may happen in only one city, such as New York, it will
have effects in other major centres almost immediately. For example,

Skadden, Arps has offices in several cities in the United States.

Contrary to what most other multi-state firms do, Skadden, Arps

pays its associates the same salary regardless of location, which
can be significant when New York firms generally pay around $ 10,000
to $ 15,000 per annum more than say Chicago firms.

Firms have two basic ways of remunerating partners, namely,
lockstep and merit. The former is remuneration based entirely on
seniority without regard to how many clients one controls. Merit pay,

however, rewards an individual partner on the basis of how many
clients that partner is responsible for and how many hours the part
ner bills in a year. More and more, firms are switching to the latter
mode of remuneration. One reason for this change is that, whilst in
previous years partners stayed with the firm they first made partner

at, inter-firm mobility has increased tremendously. A firm such as
Finley, Kumble, Wagner, Heine, Underberg, Manley, Myerson and
Casey is largely composed of lateral hires from other firms on the
promise of greater earnings than could be expected under the lock
step tradition.

Firm loyalty is in decline. Firms are also not averse to removing
partners who do not generate sufficient work for the firm. Besides
those who prove incompetent for one reason or another, those who
have specialized in a particular field are especially vulnerable. For
example, specialists in air transport regulation have suffered since
the Reagan administration deregulated the field.
The Work of Corporate Law Firms.
What then do large law firms do ? In some respects this is a dif
ficult question to answer for the simple reason that, except for jour
nalistic accounts, few data exist. The kinds of fields of law which
these lawyers practice in tell us little about what they actually do.
But some sketch of these should be drawn. Most large firms' expert
ise is in corporate work, e.g., complex contracts, international busi
ness, and large-scale litigation. Regardless of the dispute over whether

there has in recent years been a litigation explosion,18 large law

firms are geared to running large law suits over a period of years.
N? 35 - FIiVRIER 1988
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In his book, The Partners,19 Stewart presents in detail, although
somewhat overdrawn in histrionic style, several cases of law firms'
involvement in transactions and litigation, e.g., the refinancing of

Chrysler, and the IBM anti-trust suit. Both of these case studies

demonstrate the peculiar talents of the large corporate law firm.

Large-scale litigation requires intensive use of manpower over

extended periods of time. The IBM anti-trust suit involved legions of
lawyers in what was effectively one case that lasted for the better

part of a decade.20 IBM was charged with monopolizing the hard

ware part of the computer industry under section 2 of the Sherman
Act. 21 The U.S. government suit came on the heels of several private
actions instituted by smaller computer firms.22 The effect of this
multiplicity of suits was to put IBM under siege; it was attacked by
different types of organizations spread across the country.

IBM relied on its outside counsel, Cravath, Swaine and Moore, to
handle the litigation. Given the multiplicity and geographical diver
sity of the suits, IBM, through Cravath, had to employ other law
firms to act as local counsel, though at all times Cravath held the
position of lead counsel which would devise and control the strate
gies adopted in the litigation. Cravath set up its litigation headquart
ers at the White Plains head office of IBM. As the cases progressed,
more and more associates were drafted onto the IBM case.
The private and government actions against IBM effectively inter
locked; a win in one would redound to the benefit of the other. When
the first suit, a private one brought by Control Data Corporation
(CDC), was started, Cravath replied with a series of discovery requests
Cravath gave CDC's lawyers more documents than they could absorb.
As Stewart points out, there was a crucial difference in the methods
of the two sets of lawyers. Cravath had known what was in each of
the documents it had produced; conversely, CDC's lawyers did not

read every document they handed to Cravath. When the Cravath
team combed the CDC documents, they discovered evidence of a plan

by CRC to join a consortium that would have acted to fix prices
and arrange markets to suborn IBM. When CDC's lawyers realized
the information Cravath possessed, they agreed to settle.

At this stage only two partners and four associates were assigned
to the litigation. When Cravath lost one of the cases against Telex
with a $ 350 million verdict against IBM, IBM insisted that more
lawyers be put on to the cases. In all, there were three partners, about
REVUE FRANQAISE D'6TUDES AM^RICAINES
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twenty associates, and a considerable amount of help from IBM.
The verdict against IBM stimulated the government into pressing
forward its case. As discovery progressed, Cravath took somewhere in
the region of a thousand depositions of witnesses. The government
asked for 760 million IBM documents. Although the government
sought a trial date in 1974, it was not until 1976 that the trial proper
began, seven years after the U.S. Attorney General signed the com
plaint. Part of Cravath's strategy was to set up an office in the South
ern District of New York near the trial court and to form teams
around the broad issues of the case, such as ? market structure ?
and ? acts and practices, ? which would prepare the appropriate parts
of the case as those witnesses came to testify. Only the partners,
however, were allowed to speak in court.
While the government case was in progress, so were other private
suits against IBM. Cravath was forced to set up satellite teams cons
tructed out of its government team. These satellite teams travelled
around the country as and when trials began. Some of these private
actions were on trial for several months. For example, a suit brought
by Calcomp lasted for ten months. Perhaps this is one of the salient
points about this type of litigation; it drags on for years. Again, for
example, one of the government witnesses spent a total of seven
months on the witness stand.
By 1980, Cravath had won all the private cases, either at trial or
on appeal, and by 1981 it had presented its case in the government
matter. At this time the Reagan administration had taken over from
that of President Carter. And it was characterized by a libertarian,
free-market economic policy, in contrast to the previous administra
tion's intervention into the marketplace. Rather than drag the case
out interminably the government entered settlement discussions, and
in 1981 the case was dismissed.

Even within a large firm such as Cravath ? currently with 230
lawyers ? such an intensive and extensive series of interconnected
cases takes an enormous toll on a law firm. There is a danger that
a single client comes to dominate the firm. And as client loyalties
are becoming diluted as more legal jobs are being taken in-house
by corporations, to rely one one or a few large clients can prove
risky. Moreover, a single case like the IBM suit can distort the growth

of a law firm, for while the case is in progress many associates are
hired into the litigation department, but there is a danger that once
the case is finished there may be a shortage of work for them. Some
of these dangers reappear in the next case study of Chrysler Automo
tive Corporation's restructuring.
n? 35 - fSvrier 1988
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ii. Restructuring and Bankruptcy.

At the end of the 1970s Chrysler was facing imminent collapse.
The automobile company had not changed its production from heavy,
thirsty motor cars suitable to the period of cheap gasoline to lighter,
more efficient models. As a result the company's inventory was too
high and its sales were dismally low; and in 1979 Chrysler lost $ 1.1
billion dollars.24 In order to prevent a massive bankruptcy, Congress
passed the Chrysler Corporation Loan Guarantee Act of 1979. The act
stipulated that if certain conditions were met, the government would
guarantee funds for Chrysler.
To shepherd the company through the labyrinth of these conditions,

Chrysler hired Debevoise, Plimpton, Lyons and Gates (now Debe

voise and Plimpton), a large Wall Street law firm. The central requi
rement of the restructuring of Chrysler was that all of Chrysler's
and Chrysler Finance Company's (a subsidiary that financed customer
loans) debtors relinquish the primacy of their interests in favor of
the government. Manufacturers Hanover Corporation, a large bank,
was the main debtor, with over $ 55 million in debts outstanding. But
there were also around 400 other banks, large and small, in the U.S.,
Canada, Europe, and Japan which were owed large sums of money.
Any one of them could claim a default on Chrysler's part and force
Chrysler into bankruptcy, which would inflict huge losses on all cre
ditors. It was in everyone's interest to keep Chrysler afloat.
Debevoise was taken on in part because it had no major bank as a
client and was therefore free of any potential conflicts of interest.
As with the IBM anti-trust litigation, the Chrysler restructuring would

require an enormous committment of labor from Debevoise. Unlike
Cravath, Debevoise had a firm rule that no single client could claim
more than 15 percent of the firm's resources : it was obvious to the
partnership that Chrysler would breach this rule. Nevertheless, the
law firm agreed to be lead counsel for Chrysler.
In negotiating with banks in four parts of the world, Debevoise

encountered many cultural and political problems. The Japanese

concept of honor demanded that Japanese banks help Japanese cor
porations when they were in trouble. Thus the Japanese failed to
understand why the American banks were not assisting Chrysler.
They suspected the government of providing better conditions for
American banks than Japanese ones. The Canadian banks, too, were
suspicious, an attitude hardened by many years of Canadian mis
trust of the United States. The Canadian banks' loans were secured
by rights to the assets of Chrysler's subsidiary, unlike most of the
American banks' loans which were unsecured. The Canadian banks
REVUE FRANQAISE D*?rUDES AMgRICAINES
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were determined to keep this advantage. Their first step was to
freeze $ 50 million dollars of Chrysler's deposits in Canada. The
American banks were convinced that the Canadians were receiving an
unfair benefit and Debevoise had to persuade them not to scuttle the
entire restructuring because of the freeze. Eventually, Debevoise had
to assign a senior partner full-time to the Canadian negotiations.

The only true bargaining counter Debevoise possessed was the

threat that Chrysler would go bankrupt, thereby defaulting on its
loans. At certain stages in the negotiations with the banks and the
U.S. Treasury, the threat appeared imminent without the willing
agency of Chrysler. Chrysler was fast running out of money. A trans
fusion of $ 100 million from Peugeot, although having the appearance

of a loan, had to be dressed as a sale; Peugeot could not have first
priority on the stock which the ? loan ? was secured against since the
U.S. government had priority over all others. Added to these difficul
ties was the problem Debevoise had in determining the exact size
of Chrysler's likely loss for the year. Every time the figure was esta
blished, it changed for the worse, but some degree of accuracy was
essential to satisfy both the Treasury and the Securities and Exchange
Commission that the prospectus would be truthful.

When Debevoise reached a tentative agreement with the banks

and the Treasury, it began the drafting of the documents that would
tie the entire deal together. One hundred and fifty lawyers from
ten law firms worked on the drafting.
Though the great majority of the banks agreed to the terms, three
attempted to go their own route by filing lawsuits which Debevoise
had to delay and finally to invoke the help of the Treasury Secretary
to dispel the banks' fears. Piece by piece, the transaction was com

ing to a close : the European and Japanese banks agreed, but the
Canadian banks would not. Ultimately, it took the efforts of the
two governments to reconcile the differences.

When the loan guarantee application was accepted by the Treasury,
the closing could occur. Since this closing would require hundreds
of signatories signing thousand of documents, it was spread over
three law firms in Wall Street.

Discussion and Conclusion.
The lawyers in the case studies here are highly sophisticated tech
nicians. And this is the core of mega-lawyers' work. They construct
complex transactions so that every contingency is accounted for. It
may be drafting a series of interlocking documents as in the Chrysler
case; or it may be manipulating procedural matters so as to confound
n? 35 - f^vrier 1988
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the opposition as in the IBM litigation. Cravath and Debevoise could
quickly introduce large quantities of manpower to cope with exigen
cies. This ability can easily overwhelm, and is often intended to, the
opposing parties' lawyers, whether they be private practitioners or
government lawyers. Either a problem can be dragged out for an
extended time as in IBM, or it can be telescoped as in Chrysler.
These two case studies illustrate the capacities of and the exigen
cies faced by large corporate law firms. Individual lawyers and the
firms they work for must tolerate immense pressures over extended
lengths of time. In both situations discussed, the firms were profound
ly affected by the changes wrought by the nature of these cases. Both

firms breached intra-firm rules ? creating separate offices for IBM
and committing more than 15 percent of the firm's resources to
Chrysler ? that had guided their development. But such firms as
Cravath and Debevoise exist to serve the needs of capital and though
they may desire to retain a certain status quo ante, they are, however,

not immune to the economic pressures that capital exerts, for good
or ill. Yet business and the professions are held to different standards

and treated differently by the state. But given the intricate web of

connections that exist between the professions ? especially those
of law and accountancy ? and commerce and industry, it is surpris
ing perhaps that the professions have managed to maintain for so
long the idea that they are unsullied by the norms of business and
consequently should possess the privilege of regulating themselves
without community interference.25
In some respects large law firms are coming to resemble their
clients. Whereas law firms grew by taking in a class of associates
each year, training them, and eventually conferring the mantle of
partner on them, they now merge with and take over other law firms

in order to acquire missing expertise and extend their client bases.26
Partners are raised by other firms for their client-getting abilities.
Firms, which were once considered stable entities as partners remain
ed with the same firm for life, are now becoming shifting congeries
of profit centres that will exist as long as expedient.
Who then are lawyers beholden to ? Where do their fiduciary inter
ests lie ? The answer may not be easily sought: though lawyers move
from firm to firm with their clients, they use the client base they have

established as a resource to assist them in gaining and maintaining
power within the context of the firm. Power gives them the ability
to claim more money, more lawyers working on their client matters,

and to set policy in the firm. There is an intertwining of needs and
benefits that feed into and reinforce each other. One commentator
expressed the sentiment thus :
REVUE FRANQAISE D'gTUDES AM&UCAINES
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The large law firm has now become an American institution

in itself. Lawyers in big firms are no longer accountable to indi
vidual clients. Rather, they are accountable to their law firm.

Law firms are the entity, not the individual. The objective of
the large law firm is simply to make money and to grow
bigger in order to make more money. To a large extent, the
client has been left out in the cold.2?
If such is the case, and the evidence strongly suggests that the com

mercialization of the elite bar is taking place, the privileges accorded
to the traditional concept of the bar are no longer appropriate and
the conventional modes fo community response to the legal profes
sion are historically out of kilter with the modern reality.
To some extent, external regulation of the bar has already occurred.

Both the Internal Revenue Service and the Securities and Exchange
Commission have issued rules on what constitutes proper behavior
for those attorneys who practice before them. Moreover, they now
take disciplinary action against lawyers who infringe their practice
rules.28 External regulation of this kind, however, is anathema to the
concept of a self-regulating profession. But within the confines of the

bar itself, the trends show a disquieting move. Complaints, involv
ing lawyers' fees, to state bar disciplinary agencies jumped from 39,000

in 1984 to 54,000 in 1985. 2*

Finally, though the case studies only hinted at this phenomenon,
the practice of corporate law has become heavily routinized. The
documents drafted by the teams of lawyers at Debevoise were mostly

taken from standard forms everpresent on the word processor.

Although changes are made to fit the specific situation, no document
is drafted from point zero. Much of the discovery process involving
many highly priced associates entails examining boxes of intra-com
pany memoranda to determine whether they should be seen by the
other side, which requires no legal skills. Much of this kind of work
is now performed by paralegals who are considerably cheaper than
associates.30 The general counsel to Arthur Young and Company, one
of the Big Eight accounting firms, asserted : ? While I cannot empi
rically prove my next statement, in twenty years of having been
exposed to the law, I believe that 65 percent of what most lawyers do

can be done by non-lawyers and should be done by non-lawyers ?
whether that is a computer, a paralegal or some other support
staff. ? 31

Large law firms, corporate practice, mega-lawyering, whatever we
call the Leviathan, is a response to the needs and contingencies of
capitalism in the late twentieth century. But the ethos of professiona
lism that Carr-Saunders and Wilson 32 could write about so securely
n? 35 - fiSvrier 1988
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in the 1930s no longer has any meaning within the present organiza
tion of law practice. New forms demand new modes of arrangement

and theorizing. Perhaps the words of Carl Liggio, are an apposite
epilogue to this essay: Most lawyers think of themselves first and

foremost as lawyers, when in reality, they are a very small part of
a much larger profession or industry. That industry is the industry
of information management33.

NOTES

* / would like to thank Lucinda J. Peach and Mary L. Coyne for their

comments on earlier drafts of this article.

1. For the story medicine see Paul Starr, The Social Transformation of
American Medicine: The Rise of a Sovereign Profession and the Making of a

Vast Industry, New York: Basic Books, 1982.

2. Certain words are used interchangeably here. Large law firms are considered
the elite members of the bar by the nature of their clients and the work they

do for them. Sometimes I use corporate law firm instead of large law firm;
it is to emphasize that the firms work for corporations.
3. Barbara A. Curran, Supplement to the Lawyer Statistical Report: the U.S.
Legal Profession in 1985, Chicago: American Bar Foundation, 1986.

4. Id.
5. Terence C. Halliday, ? Six Score and Ten: Demographic Transitions in the
Legal Profession, 1850-1980,? Law and Society Review, vol. 20, p. 53, 1986.
6. Op. cit., Curran.
7. In 1985 law firms of 51 lawyers or more accounted for 1.2 percent of all

firms (N = 42318), but the same firms employed 11.2 percent of all private

practitioners. Curran, Supplement, op. cit., pp. 4-5.

8. ? The AmLaw 75: America's Seventy-Five Highest Grossing Firms, ?

American Lawyer, November 1986, chart.

9. See, e.g., Robert W. Gordon, ? Legal Thought and Legal Practice in the

Age of American Enterprise, 187CM920,? in Gerald L. Geison, ed., Professions
and Professional Ideologies in America, Chapel Hill, N.C.: University of North
Carolina Press, 1983, p. 70.
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10. See Roscoe Pound, The Lawyer from Antiquity to Modern Times, St. Paul,
Minn.: West Publishing Co., 1953, p. 254 passim.

11. This is especially true as we enter the postmodern age of fragmented

communities no longer tied together by common interests. See Jean-Francois

Lyotard, The Postmodern Condition: A Report on Knowledge, Minneapolis:

University of Minnesota Press, 1983.

12. Marc Galanter, ?Mega-Law and Mega-Lawyering in the Contemporary

United State,? in Robert Dingwall and Philip Lewis, eds., The Sociology of the
Professions: Lawyers, Doctors and Others, New York: St. Martin's Press, 1983,

p. 152.

13. Cf. John P. Heinz and Edward O. Laumann, Chicago Lawyers: The Social

Structure of the Bar, New York: Russell Sage Foundation and Chicago:

American Bar Foundation, 1982; and Robert L. Nelson, Practice and Privilege:

The Social Organization of Large Law Firms, unpublished Ph. D. dissertation,
Sociology Northwestern University, 1983.

14. Black's Law Dictionary (Rev. 4th ed.) defines ? partnership ? as : ? A vol
luntary contract between two or more competent persons to place their money,
effects, labor, and skill, [...] in lawful commerce or business, with the under

standing that there shall be a proportional sharing of the profits and losses
between them.?
15. Besides these two categories, law firms hire enormous staffs of paralegals,
law clerks, secretaries, librarians, messengers, and accountants.

16. Note that each state administers its own bar examination and determines
the rules for eligibility of entry. In most states passing the examination entitles

one to begin practice immediately. Vermont, for example, requires several

months of clerking in an attorney's office.

17. Members of the elite bar avoid taking graduates from the lower ranks
of law schools.
18. Cf. Marc Galanter, ? Reading the Landscape of Disputes: What We Know
and Don't Know (And Think We Know) About Our Allegedly Contentious and
Litigious Society,? UCLA Law Review, vol. 31, 1983, p. 4.

19. James B. Stewart, The Partners: Inside America's Most Powerful Law

Firms, New York: Simon and Schuster, 1983.

20. Stewart, op. cit., ?IBM: Cravath, Swaine and Moore,? pp. 53-113.
21. 15 U.S.C. s. 2 (1890).

22. Private actions are brought under section 1 of the Sherman Act. For a
more prosaic rendition of an anti-trust case see, Dorsey Ellis, Jr. and James
E. Meeks, Trial of an Anti-Trust Case, Chicago: American Bar Association
Sections of Litigation and Antitrust Law, 1977.

23. Discovery is the process whereby each side to a dispute is required by

law to hand over copies of documents requested by the other side. A lawyer's
work product is usually exempted. Document production is often a precursor

to deposing potential witnesses in a case. The theory behind discovery is to
accelerate the suit and to avoid surprise at trial: it removes again in theory,
the game element from a trial, but as we shall see, it frequently introduces its
own game elements. See, also, Wayne D. Brazil, ? Views from the Front Lines:

Observations by Chicago Lawyers about the System of Civil Discovery, ? American
Bar Foundation Research Journal, n? 4, p. 217, 1980.
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24. Stewart, op. cit., ?Chrysler: Debevoise, Plimpton, Lyons and Gate,?

pp. 201-44.

25. An interesting, but related, sideshow was presented during the recent
federal investigation of the state judiciary (? Operation Greylord ?), in Cook
County, Illinois. Every single lawyer who gave information about corrupt
activities did so only after he was theatened with prosecution. None volunteered
information. See also Jerold S. Auerbach, Unequal Justice: Lawyers and Social
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